India’s ambitious push for self-sufficiency in pulses by 2027 faces an internal contradiction: the government’s own demand-side interventions steadily undermine the private market infrastructure needed to achieve that goal, according to a report in The Hindu BusinessLine.
The Union Budget 2025-26 announced a six-year Mission for Aatma Nirbharta in Pulses, directing NAFED and the NCCF to procure tur (pigeon peas), urad (black matpe) and masoor (lentils) from pre-registered farmers over four years. The Department of Consumer Affairs has set a self-sufficiency target for pulses by 2027. This premise requires private market infrastructure to function—infrastructure that is being steadily eroded by government policies, the report argues.
Recurring Stock-Holding Limits Squeeze Private Participation
In June 2024, the Department of Consumer Affairs imposed stock-holding limits on tur and chana (chickpeas) across all states and Union Territories under the Removal of Licensing Requirements, Stock Limits and Movement Restrictions on Specified Foodstuffs (Amendment) Order, 2024. Key caps include:
| Participant | Stock Limit per Pulse |
|---|---|
| Wholesalers | 200 tonnes |
| Retailers | 5 tonnes |
| Importers | Must clear within 45 days of customs clearance |
Comparable orders were issued for tur, urad, moong and chana in 2021 and 2023. According to the report, this is not emergency policy but a recurring instrument that private market participants treat as a structural feature of pulse markets.
NCDEX Futures Market Thinning
India’s National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange (NCDEX) lists futures contracts for these four pulses, serving two functions: hedging for traders, millers and importers, and forward price signals for farmers making sowing decisions. Both depend on private participation at scale. An importer required to liquidate physical stocks within 45 days has no rational basis for holding a futures position beyond that window. A miller constrained to 25% of installed capacity faces volume limits that reduce futures engagement. The report states that NCDEX open interest and contract volume data for tur and chana show systematic thinning following major stock-control announcements. This is not price volatility; it is a withdrawal.
Basis spreads—the difference between mandi spot prices and NCDEX futures prices—widen when movement restrictions tighten across major producing states. This reflects reduced arbitrage capacity rather than random price noise. When inter-state movement of pulses is restricted, spatial price integration deteriorates. e-NAM, the Ministry of Agriculture’s electronic national agriculture market launched in 2016, was designed on the premise that open inter-state movement would create a unified national price. State-level movement bans and disclosure mandates that vary by jurisdiction work against that logic directly, the report notes.
Buffer Stock Operations Discourage Private Investment
The Price Stabilisation Fund received cumulative allocations of ₹37,489 crore from 2014-15 to 2024-25, with ₹10,000 crore budgeted for 2024-25 alone. Buffer stocks procured at the Minimum Support Price (MSP) are released through Bharat Dal retail sales and mandi-level disposals at subsidised rates. When government procurement enters a market at MSP, private buyers either match the price or step back. When buffer stocks are released below prevailing market rates, private millers face a margin environment that discourages investment in storage and processing capacity. The Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) has noted this tension in its pulses reports. Although the MSP for toor has improved over successive years, on
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